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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Duaine Frederick Earl appeals, pro se, from the summary dismissal of his
petition for post-conviction relief.

Statement of Facts and Course of the Proceedings
The relevant facts as outlined by the district court in its memorandum
decision are as follows:
Duaine Fredrick Earl was sentenced on March 6, 2000 after
pleading guilty to violating I.C. 18-6101(1), rape.
The court
sentenced Mr. Earl to a unified sentence of ten (10) years with one
(1) year determinate, but retained jurisdiction. Mr. Earl was granted
supervised probation upon returning from his rider but later violated
that probation.
A report of the probation violation was filed on or about May
7, 2002 and Mr. Earl later failed to appear to his evidentiary hearing
regarding that violation. Mr. Earl was later apprehended and
admitted to violating his probation. Mr. Earl then had his original
sentence imposed on November 25, 2002 and he was granted
credit for time served. The amount of time credited was left out of
the original Order on Motion to Revoke Probation dated December
2, 2002, but based upon a stipulation by the parties in this action
the time credited is 232 days.
Mr. Earl has filed an application for post-conviction relief and
the State has moved for Summary Dismissal of the matter. Mr. Earl
is asserting that he should be granted credit for time served on
probation, and as such he should be released immediately as his
full term release date under that calculation would have been
February 24, 2010.
(R., pp.89-90.)
Following a hearing on the state's motion for summary judgment, the court
granted the state's motion and dismissed Earl's petition for post-conviction relief
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finding no genuine issue of material fact. (R., pp.89-96.) Earl timely appealed. 1
(R., pp.100-102.)

The State Appellate Public Defender ("SAPD") was originally appointed to
represent Earl in his appeal. (R., pp.105-108.) The SAPD subsequently withdrew
from the representation of Earl based on its position that "[a]fter a thorough
review, each of the three attorneys were unable to identify a viable issue for
appeal." (Affidavit in Support of Motion For Leave to Withdraw And Motion to
Suspend the Briefing Schedule, p. 2.)
1
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ISSUES
Earl states the issues on appeal as:
I.
Assistance of counsel as enunciated within the body of the
sixth amendment to the U.S. Constitution;
II.
Subjection to double jeopardy for the same offense void of due
process of law or just compensation;
111.
Rights to due process of law and equal protection under the
law as guaranteed within the fifth and fourteenth amendments to
the U.S. Constitution;
IV.
Adherence to affording full faith and credit to judicial
proceedings and to records enumerated in article four section 1 of
the U.S. Constitution;
V.
The right to petition the government for a redress of
grievances asserted within the first amendment to the U.S.
Constitution;
VI.
Rights to be free of excessive fines and cruel and unusual
punishments as enunciated in the eighth amendment to the U.S.
Constitution and Idaho State Constitution, article 1 section 6;
VII.
Rights retained and reserved by the people as is enunciated
within the ninth and tenth amendments to the U.S. Constitution and
Idaho State Constitution article 1 sections 1, 13, & 18;
VI 11.

Adherence to Idaho statutes, i.e. titles 20-209A and 19-2603.

(Appellant's brief, pp.4-5 (verbatim).)

The state rephrases the issue as follows:
Has Earl failed to show error in the district court's summary dismissal of his
petition for post-conviction relief?
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ARGUMENT
Earl Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Erred In Summarily
Dismissing His Petition For Post-Conviction Relief
A.

Introduction
The state moved for summary dismissal of Earl's petition for post-

conviction relief, asserting Earl's claims regarding credit for time served, an
alleged violation of his double jeopardy rights, and an alleged violation of the
sentencing reform act were "bare and conclusory statements unsubstantiated by
fact" and they "fail[ed] to raise a genuine issue of material fact. " (R., p.49.) Earl,
through counsel, then filed an "Addendum Brief' addressing the issue of credit for
time served. (R., pp.66-78.) Following a hearing, the district court granted the
state's motion for summary judgment "[a]fter review of the record and finding no
genuine issue of material fact." (R., p.95.)
On appeal, Earl reasserts his original claims that he did not receive proper
credit for time served, his sentence violated his rights against double jeopardy,
was cruel and unusual, and violated his due process protections. (Appellant's
brief, pp.4-5.)
Earl's arguments on appeal fail. He has not shown that the district court
erred in summarily dismissing his post-conviction relief petition.

B.

Standard Of Review
The appellate court exercises free review over the district court's

application of the Uniform Post Conviction Procedure Act. Evensiosky v. State,
136 Idaho 189, 190, 30 P.3d 967, 968 (2001).

4

On appeal from summary

dismissal of a post-conviction petition, the appellate court reviews the record to
determine if a genuine issue of material fact exists, which, if resolved in the
applicant's favor, would entitle the applicant to the requested relief. Matthews v.
State, 122 Idaho 801, 807, 839 P.2d 1215, 1221 (1992); Aeschliman v. State,
132 Idaho 397, 403, 973 P.2d 749, 755 (Ct. App. 1999). Appellate courts freely
review whether a genuine issue of material fact exists. Edwards v. Conchemco,
Inc., 111 Idaho 851, 852, 727 P.2d 1279, 1280 (Ct. App. 1986).

Earl Has Waived Consideration Of Claims Not Raised In His Petition
For Post-Conviction Relief

C.

Earl raises new claims for the first time on appeal. He now asserts there
were "numerous causes and violations of [his] constitutional rights, including, but
not limited to, the right to effective assistance of counsel throughout all legal
proceedings," he did not receive the benefit of "full faith and credit to judicial
proceedings," and his first, ninth and tenth amendment rights were violated.
(Appellant's brief, pp.4-5).)

These claims were not asserted in his petition. (R.,

p.2.)
It is a fundamental tenet of appellate law that a claim not raised before the
district court will not be considered on appeal. State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389,
398, 3 P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. App. 2000). Because these issues were not asserted in
Earl's petition for post-conviction relief, they are not properly before this Court on
appeal.

5

D.

Earl Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Erred
Summarily Dismissing His Petition For Post-Conviction Relief

In

A petition for post-conviction relief initiates a new and independent civil
proceeding

and the petitioner bears the burden

of establishing,

by a

preponderance of the evidence, that he is entitled to relief. Workman v. State,
144 Idaho 518, 522, 164 P.3d 798, 802 (2007); State v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho
676, 678, 662 P.2d 548, 550 (1983).

However, a petition for post-conviction

relief differs from a complaint in an ordinary civil action. A petition must contain
more than "a short and plain statement of the claim" that would suffice for a
complaint.

Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 522 (referencing I.R.C.P.

8). The petitioner must submit verified facts within his personal knowledge and
produce admissible evidence to support his allegations.
4903).

~

(citing I.C. § 19-

Furthermore, the factual showing in a post-conviction relief application

must be in the form of evidence that would be admissible at an evidentiary
hearing.

Drapeau v. State, 103 Idaho 612, 617, 651 P.2d 546, 551 (1982);

Cowgerv. State, 132 Idaho 681,684,978 P.2d 241,244 (Ct. App. 1999).
Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for
post-conviction relief in response to a party's motion or on the court's own
initiative.

"To withstand summary dismissal, a post-conviction applicant must

present evidence establishing a prima facie case as to each element of the
claims upon which the applicant bears the burden of proof." State v. Lovelace,
140 Idaho 53, 72, 90 P.3d 278, 297 (2003) (citing Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581,
583, 6 P.3d 831, 833 (2000)). Thus, a claim for post-conviction relief is subject to
summary dismissal pursuant to I.C. § 19-4906 "if the applicant's evidence raises

6

no genuine issue of material fact" as to each element of petitioner's claims.
Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802 (citing l.C. § 19-4906(b), (c));
Lovelace, 140 Idaho at 72, 90 P.3d at 297.

While a court must accept a

petitioner's unrebutted allegations as true, the court is not required to accept
either the applicant's mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible
evidence, or the applicant's conclusions of law. Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164
P.3d at 802 (citing Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 110, 112
(2001 )). If the alleged facts, even if true, would not entitle the petitioner to relief,
the trial court is not required to conduct an evidentiary hearing prior to dismissing
the petition.

kl (citing

Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 865, 869, 801 P.2d 1216, 1220

(1990)). "Allegations contained in the application are insufficient for the granting
of relief when (1) they are clearly disproved by the record of the original
proceedings, or (2) do not justify relief as a matter of law."

kl

In its order granting the state's motion for summary judgment and
dismissing Earl's petition for post-conviction relief, the district court articulated the
applicable legal standards (R., pp.90-92) and set forth, in detail, the reasons Earl
failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact on any of his claims (R., pp.9295). The state adopts the district court's written opinion as its argument on
appeal, a copy of which is attached hereto as Appendix A.

Earl does not

specifically challenge any of the court's findings or legal conclusions (see
generally Appellant's Brief), and he has otherwise failed to establish the district
court erred in dismissing his petition.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's
order summarily dismissing Earl's petition for post-conviction relief.
DATED this 19th day of February 201 .

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 19th day of February 2013, I caused two
true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to be placed
in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to:
DUAINE FREDRICK EARL
144 W. 100 S.
Rupert, ID 83350
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MINIDOKA
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

vs.
Case No. CV-2011-0697
Duaine Fredrick Earl,
Defendant.
DOB:

I

MEMORANDUM DECISION

I. INTRODUCTION
Duaine Fredrick Earl was sentenced on March 6, 2000 after pleading guilty to
violating J.C. 18-6101(1), rape. The court sentenced Mr. Earl to a unified sentence often
(10) years with one (1) year determinate, but retained jurisdiction. Mr. Earl was granted
supervised probation upon returning from his rider but later violated that probation.
A report of the probation violation was filed on or about May 7, 2002 and Mr.
Earl later failed to appear to his evidentiary hearing regarding that violation. Mr. Earl was
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later apprehended and admitted to violating his probation. Mr. Earl then had his original
sentence imposed on November 25, 2002 and he was granted credit for time served. The
amount of time credited was left out of the original Order on Motion to Revoke Probation
dated December 2, 2002, but based upon a stipulation by the parties in this action the
time credited is 232 days.
Mr. Earl has filed an application for post-conviction relief and the State has
moved for Swnmary Dismissal of the matter. Mr. Earl is asserting that he should be
granted credit for time served on probation, and as such he should be released
immediately as his full term release date under that calculation would have been February
24, 2010. Mr. Earl bases this conclusion on five separate grounds, but for the reasons set

forth below this court disagrees with his assertions and grants the State's Motion for
Summary Dismissal.
II. APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Post-Conviction Standards
An application for post-conviction relief initiates a proceeding, which is civil in

nature. State v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho 676, 678 (1983); Clark v. State, 92 Idaho 827, 830
(1969); Murray v. State, 121 Idaho 918, 921 (Ct. App. 1992). An application for postconviction relief differs from a complaint in an ordinary civil action in that it must
contain more than "a short and plain statement of the claim" that would suffice for a
complaint under I.RC.P. 8(a)(l). Martinez v. State, 126 Idaho 813, 816 (Ct. App. 1995).
Rather an application for post-conviction relief must be verified with respect to facts
within the personal knowledge of the applicant, and affidavits, records, or other evidence
supporting its allegations must be attached, or the application must state why such
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supporting evidence is not included with the application. J.C.§ 19-4903. Like a plaintiff
in a civil action, the applicant must prove by a preponderance of evidence the allegations

upon which the request for post-conviction relief is based. J.C. § 19-4907; Russell v.
State, 118 Idaho 65, 67 (Ct. App. 1990).

The post-conviction petitioner must make factual allegations showing each
essential element of the claim and a showing of admissible evidence must support those
factual allegations. Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644,647 (Ct App. 1994); Drapeau v.
State, 103 Idaho 612, 617 (Ct. App. l 982); Stone v. State, 108 Idaho 822 (Ct. App. l 985).

The district court may take judicial notice of the record of the underlying criminal case.
Hays v. State, 113 Idaho 736, 739 (Ct. App. 1987), aff'd 115 Idaho 315 (1988), overruled
on other grounds State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981 (1992).
B. Summary Dismissal Standards

Idaho Code § 19-4906(c) authorizes summary disposition of an application for
post-conviction relief. Summary dismissal of an application pursuant to I.C. 19-4906(c) is
the procedural equivalent of summary judgment under I.R.C.P. 56. State v. LePage, 138
Idaho 803, 806 (Ct. App. 2003). Summary dismissal of an application is permissible
when "there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law''. I.C. § 19-4906(c). If such a genuine issue of material fact is
presented, an evidentiary hearing must be conducted. Gonzales v. State, 120 Idaho 759,
763 (Ct. App. 1991); Ramirez v. State, 113 Idaho 87, 89 (Ct. App. 1987).
Conversely, the "application must present or be accompanied by admissible
evidence supporting its allegations or the application will be subject to dismissal."
Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 269, 272 (Ct. App. 2002) review denied (2003); LePage,
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138 Idaho at 807 (citing Roman, 125 Idaho at 647); Follinus v. State, 127 Idaho 897 (Ct.
App. 1995); Stone v. State, 108 Idaho 822, 826 (Ct. App. 1985). Allegations are
insufficient for the grant of relief when they do not justify relief as a matter of law. Stuart

v. State, 118 Idaho 865, 869 (1990); Cooper v. State, 96 Idaho 542, 545 (1975);
Remington v. State, 127 Idaho 443, 446-47 (Ct. App. 1995).
Bare or conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated by any facts, are inadequate to
entitle a petitioner to an evidentiary hearing. Roman, 125 Idaho at 647; Baruth v.

Gardner, 1 IO Idaho 156, 159 (Ct App. 1986); Stone, 108 Idaho at 826. If a petitioner
fails to present evidence establishing an essential element on which he bears the burden
of proof, summary dismissal is appropriate. Mata v. State, 124 Idaho 588,592 (Ct. App.
1993).

III. ANALYSIS
Reviewing the record in this case and the assertions made by Mr. Earl it is
apparent that this is a matter of law and that no material facts are in dispute. There is no
dispute as to the dates that Mr. Earl was imprisoned and the dates he was on probation.
Rather, the dispute is centered on whether the time Mr..Earl was on probation or parole is
to be considered as credit for time served. Mr. Earl claims that his assertion is supported
on five different grounds, which shall be addressed in order.
A. Violations of I.C. §§ 19-2603 and 20-209A

Mr. Earl asserts that to not include his time on probation or parole would be
violations of I.C. §§ 19-2603 and 20-209A, as he was not voluntarily absent from the
control of the board of correction while on probation. It is clear from Mr. Earl's assertion
regarding control that he has misinterpreted the plain language of the statutes and has
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ignored the controlling authority; Taylor v. State, 145 Idaho 866 (Ct.App.2008) and State

v. Sutton, 113 Idaho 832 (Ct.App.1987) are directly contrary to petitioner's claim.
I.C. § 20-209A states:
When a person is sentenced to the custody of the board of correction, his term of
confinement begins from the day of his sentence. A person who is sentenced may
receive credit toward service of his sentence for time spent in physical custody
pending trial or sentencing, or appeal, if that detention was in connection with the
offense for which the sentence was imposed. The time during which the person is
voluntarily absent from the penitentiary, jail, facility under the control of the
board of correction, or from the custody of an officer after his sentence, shall not
be estimated or counted as a part of the term for which he was sentenced.
The plain language of this statute makes it clear that time spent on probation or
parole is not to be included as credit for time served. Probation and parole are times that a
person is voluntarily absent from a facility, jail, or penitentiary that is under the control of
the board of corrections. The language is obvious that it is a physical structure (i.e.
penitentiary, jail, or facility) that must be under the control of the board of correction
which a person must be voluntarily absent from. The statute makes no mention of any
individual person being under the control of the board of correction as Mr. Earl asserts.
Also being on probation or parole is not being under the custody of an officer, as custody
and supervision are two very different concepts.
Under the plain language of I.C. 20-209A it is obvious that probation and parole
are considered being voluntarily absent from a physical structure that is under the control
of the board of correction and that it is not being under the custody of an officer. Mr.
Earl's perverted interpretation of the statute has no legal support, and Idaho case law is
clear that Mr. Earl's time on supervised probation and parole does not qualify as credit
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fortiine served. See I.C. §18-309; I.C. §19-2603; see also Taylor v. State, 145 Idaho 866,
869-870 (Ct.App.2008); State v. Sutton, 113 Idaho 832 (Ct.App.1987).
B. Violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause

Mr. Earl asserts that not having his time on probation and parole calculated as part
of his credit for time served would in effect extend the length of his maximum sentence,
and as such is a new punishment for the same crime. He claims that his probation/parole
violations were matters involving the same parties from his original sentencings on the
underlying crimes and that the issues had been previously determined by a valid and final
judgment. For these reasons, Mr. Earl asserts that his United States 5th Amendment right
against double jeopardy has been violated. This is incorrect.
The United States 5th Amendment right against double jeopardy protects a person
from being prosecuted a second time for the same offense after acquittal or conviction. It
also protects an individual from multiple punishments for the same offense.
In this case, Mr. Earl received a unified sentence often years during the original
sentencing, a sentence that was later suspended when Mr. Earl was put on probation. Mr.
Earl's probation was revoked after he violated the terms and conditions of probation
resulting in the imposition of the original sentence. The same occurred when his parole
was revoked.
In no way is this prosecuting Mr. Earl a second time for the same offense, nor is

it another punishment for the same offense. Rather, Mr. Earl was given an opportunity to

avoid the imposition of his original sentence; an opportunity that he squandered by
violating probation. As such, Mr. Earl's claim that his United States 5th Amendment right
against double jeopardy was violated has no legal support and is dismissed.
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C. Violation of 14 th Amendment Rights

After review of this matter, this Court has found no violation of Mr. Earl's 14th
Amendment Rights. Mr. Earl was afforded due process in every action against him and
the court acted lawfully throughout the course of this matter. Mr. Earl has offered no
legal support for this claim and as such it too is dismissed.
D. Violation of Sentencing Reform Act of 1984

Mr. Earl's claim of a violation of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 is based on
his misunderstanding of the law and he offers no legal support to help his cause. The
court lawfully imposed a sentence and then lawfully suspended that sentence to give Mr.
Earl the opportunity to prove himself on probation. After Mr. Earl failed on probation he
then had the original sentence imposed. All of the court's actions were in accordance
with the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984. Mr. Earl's mischaracterization of the legal
precedent regarding this Act offers no support whatsoever for his claims and as such this
claim is dismissed.
IV. CONCLUSION

After review of the record and finding no genuine issue of material fact, this court
finds that summary dismissal is appropriate in this matter. The legal merits of this case all
fall in favor of the State, and as such their Motion for Summary Dismissal is GRANTED.
(..,

Dated this

1(1

day of February, 2012
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